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Article 8

Comment: Federalizing Organized Crime
by
HONORABLE VAUGHN

R. WALKER*

The authors state: "One way or another, federal statutes reach
most major malefactions and many minor ones, and there is no realistic prospect of reversing that trend."' To the extent that this is a positive statement, I agree with it. However, to the extent that this is a
normative statement, I believe this state of affairs to be both unfortunate and to have rather far-reaching implications not addressed by the
authors.
The authors take for granted the nation's large and generously
funded federal law enforcement apparatus-the United States Attorneys, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Customs Service, and so forth.
The authors assume that a system of federal courts, separate from
state tribunals, will always exist and be available for the adjudication
of certain criminal cases, most of which could also be brought in state
courts. Yet neither the federal law enforcement apparatus nor the
lower federal courts (Le., everything under the United States Supreme
Court) is a necessary feature of government under our Constitution.
The United States Constitution established neither (although Article I
expressly grants Congress the power to create "tribunals inferior to
the Supreme Court") nor does federalism require either one.
There is no reason why such laws as Congress sees fit to enact
could not be enforced through the state courts. This includes conduct
that Congress declares to be criminal. Such conduct could be investigated by state and local police or law enforcement agencies and prosecuted by state prosecutors in state courts. Federal criminal law could
be just another of those unfunded mandates that Congress imposes on
the states and about which we have heard so much lately. Alternatively, Congress could provide that some federal criminal statutes are
enforceable solely in state courts reserving federal criminal jurisdiction for others. This could be, but generally it is not. Unfortunately,
the authors do not supply us the "why not."
*
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The authors completely fail to discuss why these federal institutions exist and, more importantly, why they should exist. Instead, the
authors focus on the result of creating a dual enforcement and adjudicatory mechanism: some cases will be easier to prosecute in one forum or the other; some cases will not.
The authors eschew any attempt at justifying a separate federal
criminal jurisdiction generally or for the specific assignment they
would give to federal law enforcement and judiciary: a battle against
something they call organized crime. Nowhere in their Article do the
authors offer any theory or even a hint of one by which a federal
crime could be distinguished from a nonfederal crime. Indeed, it appears that the obliteration of any such distinction is central to their
thesis that federal prosecutors ought to stand by as kind of an auxiliary law enforcement squad to step in whenever particularly complex
cases arise, which are most likely in the authors' view to be ones involving organized crime.
For the authors, the most important constraint on federal prosecutors is not some principle of jurisprudence, but the resources available to them. In view of the inescapable fact that resources for this
governmental endeavor, as all others, are not inexhaustible (thankfully, in my view), the allocation of prosecutorial resources becomes
for the authors an issue of costs and benefits: prosecutors should have
jurisdiction where their resources produce the greatest yields, presumably measured by convictions.
Because federal prosecutors do a better job in prosecuting organized criminals, say the authors, this should be the assignment of these
prosecutors. Three reasons are given. First, federal evidentiary rules
permit conviction on the basis of uncorroborated accomplice testimony. This rule, the authors contend, converts criminal cases in federal court into a credibility contest between the federal prosecutor
and the defendants, who are of course generally unsavory characters
and thus virtually certain to lose such a contest.
Second, federal prosecutors possess greater ability to control and
direct grand juries than state prosecutors. Although the authors do
not clearly spell out why federal prosecutors are better at this than
their state counterparts, the more expansive territorial reach of federal law seems reason enough not to quibble with this assertion.
Third, the Sentencing Guidelines do a better job of empowering
federal prosecutors to set the agenda in plea bargaining and obtain a
greater degree of cooperation from criminal associates than do state
sentencing laws.
If these three features of federal criminal practice are advantages
of a federal forum, and indeed from a prosecutors' perspective they
would appear to be, they would seem to apply to any kind of crime-
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organized or disorganized. Therefore, it is difficult to understand why
the type of jurisdiction, rather than the gravity of the crime, should
decide their use. But the authors do not analyze which types of crime
impose the greatest societal costs nor do the authors consider the respective benefits to society of eradication of these crimes or, more
properly, the efficacy of enforcement and prosecutorial effort directed
to each. At best, the authors' allocative argument is incomplete.
However, in my view, it is worse. Furthermore, the argument hinges
on a predicate that I find doubtful.
The phrase "organized crime" may sound more ominous than
"crime" used by itself, but this may owe as much to Hollywood and
the popular press as reality. The authors, who would enlist the federal
courts in a crusade against something they label as organized crime,
do so without even telling us what they mean by the phrase.
Plainly, the difference between organized crime and other crime
is not simply a matter of planning and hierarchy. Conspiracies are
organized, but are plainly not what the authors appear to mean by
organized crime. At one point in their Article, the authors refer to
"enterprise crime." Maybe this is not synonymous with what the authors mean by organized crime, maybe it was just a fallback to the
definition of racketeering under the RICO statute, but it nonetheless
well describes a distinction that I believe can be drawn between types
of crimes and seems to fit the authors' thesis.
The distinction arises out of the fact that some criminal laws create an incentive for their own disobedience; others do not. The former typically are enacted for the purpose of uplifting the social or
economic condition of society or certain of its members. The latter
possess no such ambitions. Laws against robbery which are a crime of
the second type do not create the economic incentive to steal. That
incentive preexists the creation of the crime and stems from the possession of a valued article by someone other than the potential robber.
On the other hand, at least as much of the incentive to traffic in narcotics is a product of the laws against that activity as it is of the desire
of users for the prohibited substances. The incentive added by declaring trafficking in narcotics to be criminal comes from driving out of
the market those sellers too squeamish (or wise) to break the law, thus
increasing the price and profits available to those who lack such
reservations.
Enterprise or organized criminals are those entrepreneurs willing
to respond to those law-created incentives by stepping forward when
the laws' ambitions afford opportunity and by furnishing what people
want but the law says they should not have: narcotics, sex for hire,
goods or technology that our legislators or bureaucrats have determined we should not have without imposition of substantial duties or
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not at all, children that authorities determine should not be adopted,
games of chance that the community does not countenance, or protection by means beyond the bounds of the law. Such criminal activity
differs from other criminal activity in that it is motivated at least in
part, sometimes substantially, by criminalization of the conduct itself
rather than by preexisting circumstances.
The most profitable of these activities currently, of course, is the
narcotics trade. It is true that so-called organized crime figures do
commit law violations of the second type; the authors prominently
mention gangland murder, an evocative activity to say the least, but
one that is plainly a sideline or tertiary function of the main activities
of the organizations the authors mention and seldom a profitable
activity.
Organized or enterprise criminals for the most part devote themselves to conducting an arbitrage between the desire of the community to improve itself through law making and the unwillingness or
inability of individuals to conform their conduct to the community's
lofty aspirations. This takes planning, skill, and capital beyond the
capabilities and reach of most people inclined to break the law.
The Founders were quite familiar with the phenomenon. Smuggling is one of the four crimes expressly mentioned in the Constitution
and is itself an example of a crime created to uplift the community by,
among other goals, protecting against infectious diseases, generating
customs revenues, or sheltering the incomes of domestic producers.
Incentives to commit the second type of crime do not increase
with the severity of the punishment provided for such crime or the
resources devoted to its detection and prosecution. The opposite is
true with the first type. Indeed, the greater the disparity between the
community's aspirations professed through the severity of punishment
for such crime and the resources devoted to its detection and prosecution, on the one hand, and the willingness of individuals to abide by
these laws, on the other, the greater will be the intensity of the effort
required to fight crime of that type. A nation with an ambitious
agenda of social and economic improvement through law and regulation must inevitably accompany that program with one of vigorous
criminal law enforcement; they are inseparable partners.
Now I do not want to go down in history as the first (and only?)
federal judge to say something nice about organized crime. I am no
fan of it. But organized or enterprise crime is not without a beneficial
feature. When the community's desire for uplift through law and the
realities of mankind diverge beyond a certain degree, organized crime
cannot be stopped no matter how extensive the law enforcement effort. This was true with Prohibition, the so-called Noble Experiment.
The rum runners and bootleggers of the early part of this century ex-
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posed the utter unworkability of laws designed to wean Americans
from a substance that, for a great many, was terribly destructive.
Although we tend now to snicker at the quaintness of the political
and social ambitions that gave rise to Prohibition and the temperance
movement, they were motivated by the highest hopes and best of intentions and addressed a serious problem of widespread alcoholism in
the United States. In due course, it became clear that these good intentions could not rescue the effort from the utter unworkability of
achieving these goals through the criminal laws. This reality became
undeniable and so obvious that the nation shifted to a more realistic
(if still highly imperfect) approach to regulating liquor distribution.
In my opinion, the same situation applies today to narcotics. Today's drug traffickers are proving the same point with respect to what
federal law labels "controlled substances." This does not mean that
the narcotics laws are the product of anything other than the best of
intentions and deep concern for those who ruin their own and other
lives with drugs. It also does not mean that dope peddlers are an admirable or public spirited group; for the most part, they are pretty
despicable. Still further, this does not mean that it is wise to make
narcotics as freely available as other plainly harmful substances, such
as cigarettes and liquor, for example. But the fact that our present
laws of narcotics prohibition provide livelihood to such repugnant elements of our society is a principal reason for a new approach. If the
authors really wanted to cut organized crime off at the pockets, they
could do so far more effectively by advocating repeal of narcotics prohibition than by their proposal to devote federal criminal jurisdiction
to prosecuting organized crime whose largest source of revenue is narcotics trafficking.
Because so much of the profit in crimes whose incentives are produced by the crime itself is within our control, society, in my view, has
less to fear from organized crime than it does from what one might
call its opposite: disorganized crime. By this term, I mean unpredictable and random violence against persons and property, both petty
and grave, that is produced not by controllable incentives but responds to individual and social pathologies wholly beyond our understanding. Such crime rips the social fabric more severely than the
more or less predictable and confined activities of so-called organized
or enterprise criminals. Disorganized or nonenterprise crime extracts
a terrible toll from society. This is the crime that, for example,
prompts people who have no interest in firearms for sport or recreation to maintain personal arsenals or to worry because they do not do
so, keeps people at home at night away from the activities that make
community life enjoyable, makes people fearful of helping a stranger
in need of assistance, and even causes people to live in fear in their
own homes behind locks, alarms, and with guard dogs.
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Because in its petty manifestations it is so frequent, nonenterprise
or disorganized crime may somehow seem less awesome than organized or enterprise crime and hence less suited for the unquestionably
more majestic confines of federal courts. This perception, implicit in
our authors' thesis, is widely shared and has determined that the battle against disorganized crime is largely being fought by state and local
law enforcement authorities and prosecutors in state, not federal,
courts. The contribution of federal law enforcement agencies and
courts to the effort to fight this type of crime has thus been minuscule.
This may be unfortunate, because it is in this battle that the resources
now devoted to federal law enforcement and adjudication could pay
big dividends, the resources of state law enforcement authorities and
courts being stretched so thin.
If it is true, as our authors tell us, that no type of crime is off
limits to federal authorities and courts, why should not federal efforts
be devoted to the area of greatest need? Alternatively, if it can be
shown that the resources that Congress devotes to federal law enforcement agencies and courts might well be more effectively spent at
the state and local level, can there be any principled objection to such
diversion? The greatest enforcement needs, after all, would seem to
arise from the crimes that most commonly affect most people. These
are not those committed by organized criminals. Given their premise,
can the authors suggest any reason that the more muscular law enforcement authorities and well-endowed judiciary of the federal government should not be assigned the task of fighting that kind of
crime?
My point in this commentary is not to debate the merits of defining any particular conduct as criminal or not (although some of my
views on this are quite obvious), but simply to make two points. First,
if the authors' objective is to battle organized or enterprise crime,
measures to alter the incentives for such crime need to be considered
along with enforcement measures and, in my opinion, are likely often
to be far more effective. Second, if the authors' objective is to justify
the existence of an elite cadre of federal law enforcers and judges able
to step in when the battle against crime at the state level gets tough,
the authors have failed to establish that federal institutions are better.
Without a principle based on constitutional text or understanding
to distinguish the respective responsibilities of state and federal institutions, there is no basis for allocating these responsibilities but administrative convenience and efficacy. On these criteria, federal law
enforcers, prosecutors, and judges cannot, in my view, hold a candle to
their state counterparts and certainly the authors have not established
the contrary.
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Whether accomplice testimony is allowed or not, or the severity
of the sentencing laws, for example, are trifling differences between
state and federal practice that cannot guide us in deciding a momentous issue of constitutional responsibility. If mechanical features of
federal criminal procedure are appropriate to certain types of criminal
prosecutions, such procedural rules can be transported to state courts
and applied by state authorities in prosecutions for those types of
crime no less than federal authorities in federal courts.
Attempting to distinguish the proper functions of federal law enforcers and courts from those of the states on the basis of their procedures and comparative advantages ultimately cannot escape the
conclusion that if this is all there is to it, there might as well be no
distinction whatsoever and, if there is none, why do we need two sets
of such institutions? The authors leave us without an answer.
This discussion is being conducted in an academic setting where
provocative notions can and should be aired. I do not, of course, endorse so-called organized crime, and I do not expect that federal criminal jurisdiction will be abolished or even necessarily that it should.
But any discussion of federalization of crime should not take the existence of federal criminal law enforcement and adjudication for
granted. The Founders were not oblivious to the depredations of
crime; they knew well what organized or enterprise crime was all
about. Although the authors have not made the case for it, there may
be a basis for contending that federal law enforcers and judges have a
special role with respect to organized crime or, perhaps more accurately, some aspects of it. Yet the Founders created a federal government without mandating a judiciary or enforcement apparatus
separate from those of the states. After all, the states are bound to
abide by federal law as the supreme law of the land, so separate federal law enforcement agencies and courts are unnecessary adjuncts of
federal policy.
Inquiry into whether a separate federal judiciary and law enforcement apparatus has a role distinctly different from that of its counterpart state institutions should not begin with their respective
procedural rules, for that inquiry leads nowhere. The inquiry should
begin with the principles found in our Constitution. One source may
be the role of federal law foreseen by the Founders. The record may
be sparse and I do not suggest that we need be confined by a literal
interpretation of that record any more than we are so limited when
making other constitutional inquiries. But it is here, in our constitutional inheritance and traditions, that any principled distinction may
be found, if one is to be located. It is regrettable that our authors did
not make this the starting point of their inquiry.
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One point of caution should be emphasized, however. In a country as large and diverse as the United States, views on what activities
should be regarded as criminal and the relative importance to attach
to them will differ greatly. As we make these choices at ever more
embracing levels, from family or group to village to city to county to
state and finally to national government, achievement of a consensus
on these matters becomes increasingly difficult. Without a broad consensus among the people to whom the laws apply, enforcement becomes impossible.
Because of the greater difficulty in achieving and maintaining this
consensus at the national level than at other levels, the kind of conduct that can effectively be criminalized is not, as the authors suggest,
necessarily the more complex and sophisticated. Indeed, it may work
just the other way; at least sometimes, it may be more difficult to
maintain consensus as to complex and sophisticated crimes than the
simple and straightforward ones.
While, of course, I do not rule out the possibility that the federal
government's resources should be devoted to at least some criminal
law enforcement and adjudication, the authors have not given us
enough to define what that role should be. The mechanical features
of criminal law enforcement and adjudication stressed by the authors
do not, in my view, supply that definition.

